Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

Beyond Iran: Containing Nuclear Development in the Middle East

ABSTRACT

Several states in the Middle East have noted their interest in nuclear energy programs, but current cost and timeline estimates understate the difficulties that these states will face. A state-level analysis of nuclear development capacities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates suggests that building nuclear infrastructure in the region will, in fact, be a lengthy and expensive endeavor, due to concerns such as export constraints, public opposition, a lack of human resources, and high overhead costs. This has implications for nuclear weapon nonproliferation: first, fears that these developing nuclear energy capabilities may facilitate possible weapon proliferation are premature, and second, there is time to ensure that any burgeoning nuclear infrastructure in the region remains safe and civilian in nature.     

NATO Territorial Ballistic Missile Defense and its Implications for Arms Control

ABSTRACT

Since 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

From the people's army to the Jewish people's army: the IDF's force structure between professionalization and militarization

The article discusses processes of “religionization” within the institutional identity and ethos of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the connection of these processes with the significant structural changes the IDF has undergone in recent decades. The main argument presented is that since the late 1980s, the IDF has been in a culture conflict, torn between soldiers and civilians who advocate turning the IDF into a professional army “military professionalization,” and others who wish to preserve, and even strengthen, the “people's army” model. The present article shows that the meaning of the term “people” in this phrase has shifted to refer strictly to the Jewish people, and that a national-ethnic perception strongly influenced by religious-national ideology has been adopted.     

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

“This program will not be a threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China

Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap.     

美军训练转型的特点及启示

美军是世界新军事变革的积极倡导者和先行者,其以信息化为核心的全面军事转型计划启动早,成效明显,具有丰富的实践经验。借鉴美军的训练转型经验,对于准确理解和把握战斗力生成模式转变的特点规律,探索战斗力生成模式转变的方法途径,破除制约战斗力生成的瓶颈,加快推进战斗力生成模式转变,提升信息化条件下的作战能力,具有一定的理论和现实意义。     

我军武器装备跨越式发展应处理好几个关系

介绍了实现我军武器装备跨越式发展的基本思路,全面、辨证地分析了武器装备建设的现实需要、现有条件、长远目标和要求,提出了必须处理好的5个重大关系,以确保这一战略目标的实现.     

Sequential and systematic sampling plans for the Markov‐dependent production process

Acceptance sampling plans are used to assess the quality of an ongoing production process, in addition to the lot acceptance. In this paper, we consider sampling inspection plans for monitoring the Markov‐dependent production process. We construct sequential plans that satisfy the usual probability requirements at acceptable quality level and rejectable quality level and, in addition, possess the minimum average sample number under semicurtailed inspection. As these plans result in large sample sizes, especially when the serial correlation is high, we suggest new plans called “systematic sampling plans.” The minimum average sample number systematic plans that satisfy the probability requirements are constructed. Our algorithm uses some simple recurrence relations to compute the required acceptance probabilities. The optimal systematic plans require much smaller sample sizes and acceptance numbers, compared to the sequential plans. However, they need larger production runs to make a decision. Tables for choosing appropriate sequential and systematic plans are provided. The problem of selecting the best systematic sampling plan is also addressed. The operating characteristic curves of some of the sequential and the systematic plans are compared, and are observed to be almost identical. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 451–467, 2001